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“[A]n unexamined life is not worth living.”2

I. INTRODUCTION
With few exceptions, a user can sign up for an account and receive
content and services without providing anything more than the credentials
they wish to use at the site.3 Yet the companies that provide these services

1

Sean Brian, J.D. Candidate 2015, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES 77 (D. F. Nevill trans., 1901).
3
Ethan Zuckerman, The Internet’s Original Sin, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014, 6:04 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-internets-original-sin/376041/.
2
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are valued in the billions of dollars.4 Users have a vague sense that
Facebook, Google, and other Internet companies make money through
advertising, and indeed the sheer number of users is a big factor in attracting
advertisers, but this is only a small part of the picture.5 The other, and
perhaps even more valuable, source of revenue is the data that these
companies collect about users’ preferences and demographics.6 In sum, data
has become the currency of the Internet.
An entire industry has developed around purchasing, analyzing, and
even combining the data collected by Internet companies.7 This industry is
largely responsible for allowing the Internet to evolve from a means of
sharing information between universities into what it has become today.8
Both the gathering and use of data collected online have begun to raise
privacy concerns with regulators.9 They question whether consumers are
really giving informed consent as they sign up for these services, and what
limits should be placed on the use and sale of consumer data, including
whether consumers should have the opportunity to opt out.10
Overly burdensome regulation could end the era of free online
services as well as limit access to the wealth of data they produce.11
Currently, a patchwork of privacy regulations and laws have left marketing
associations trying to fill the void with industry-best-practices to provide
clear guidelines on gathering and using data while respecting consumers’

4
See Market Value of the Largest Internet Companies Worldwide as of May 2014 (in Billion U.S.
Dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-of-the-largest-internetcompanies-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
5
Mark Sullivan, How Will Facebook Make Money?, PCWORLD (Jun. 14, 2010, 10:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/198815/ssss.html.
6
Id.; see also Thiag Loganathan, Are You Using Your Data to its Full Potential?, DMI,
http://dminc.com/blog/using-data-fullest-potential/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
See generally
DATAFLOQ, https://datafloq.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
7
See Loganathan, supra note 6; Jennifer L. Rathburn & Simone Colgan Dunlap, Big Data, Big
Risk: Strategies to Mitigate Risks Associated with Data Monetization, INSIDE COUNSEL (Dec. 18, 2014),
available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/12/18/big-data-big-risk-strategies-to-mitigate-risks-ass.
8
Zuckerman, supra note 3; Erin Griffith, An Audacious Plan to Fix the Internet’s Original Sin,
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/26/ello-social-network/.
9
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DATA BROKERS A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2014) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
10
Id. at app. C-7; Grant Gross, FTC to Consider Stricter Online Privacy Rules, PCWORLD (Dec. 7,
2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/183910/article.html (quoting FTC Chairman Jon
Leibowitz: “How many consumers . . . have ever heard the names of the many ad networks that end up
with their information in the process of targeting ads . . . [h]ow many people understand the networks’
role?”) (alterations in original).
11
See Alexis C. Madrigal, How Much is Your Data Worth? Mmm, Somewhere Between Half a Cent
and $1,200, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/03/how-much-is-your-data-worth-mmm-somewhere-between-half-a-cent-and-1-200/254730/
(“If, post-facto, you inform people that you're already using their data, they won't pay to stop you. But if
you ask beforehand, they might.”)
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privacy.12 Although these guidelines are not binding, reputable companies
have a strong incentive to adhere to them because they know that consumer
trust is gained over years and lost in only instants.13 Less reputable
companies and outright scammers gather data simply because they know it
can be sold or used in phishing or identity-theft-schemes.14 Thus far, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has focused on enforcement of
companies’ self-imposed privacy policies and has yet to provide minimum
requirements for those policies.15 Continued concerns have led academics to
question whether the time for self-regulation has passed.16 This Comment
considers how regulation similar to the Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts
or Practices (“UDAAP”) standard, which currently protects the customers of
financial institutions, could be adapted to protect consumers online while
allowing companies to leverage the valuable benefits that data can provide.
Part II gives a brief review of the benefits and risks created by the
analytical power that big data can provide, current methods of online data
collection and use, the legal framework currently in place, and why banking
regulations would serve as a good model for the data industry. Part III gives
an outline of risk-based, disclosure-oriented regulatory guidelines modeled
after standards developed in the banking industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Power of Big Data
The basic object of statistical analysis is to use samples to
generalize about a larger population.17 More data lends greater predictive
power to the generalizations that result from the study.18 Data gathered
through the Internet not only provides access to a nearly endless supply of
12

See, e.g., DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION’S GUIDELINES
ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICE 20 (2014), available at https://thedma.org/wp-content/uploads/DMAEthics-Guidelines.pdf.
13
Telephone Interview with Chuck Sharp, CEO, RightIntel (Sept. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Sharp
Interview]; see also Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her
Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/
how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/.
14
Sharp Interview, supra note 13.
15
Jonathan P. Cody, Comment, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the Time Come to
Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1211 (1999), http://scholarship.law.edu/law
review/vol48/iss4/7.
16
Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3–5 (2010); Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy and
It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2013); Robert Sprague and Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving
Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws,
19 ALBANY L. J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 91–92 (2009); Cody, supra note 15, at 1191–92; Ryan Moshell, . . .
And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend
Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 359 (2005).
17
MICHAEL SULLIVAN, III, STATISTICS: INFORMED DECISIONS USING DATA 5 (Sally Yagan et al.
eds., Student ed. 2004).
18
Id. at 464–65.
FOR
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data points, but also allows data to be gathered on an individual basis,
eliminating the need for generalizations. Both the generalizations obtained
through analysis of large datasets and the individual data itself carry risks
and benefits for consumers.
1. Benefits and Risks of Aggregate Data
Increasing predictive power through increasing sample size is the
driving force behind machine learning. Rather than programming the proper
response to every problem an application might encounter, machine learning
allows a computer program to gather data until it learns how to respond.19
For example, in the 1950s an IBM engineer wrote a program that allowed
him to play checkers against a computer.20 Because the computer only
understood the concept of a legal move, he could easily beat it.21 After
designing a process that allowed the computer to record the odds of winning
given a board configuration, he was still able to beat it.22 But after allowing
the computer to play against itself, it was able to produce enough data to
develop accurate probabilities of winning based on each board
configuration.23 This proceeded until Arthur Samuel could no longer win a
single game against his computer opponent—he had designed a machine
that was better than he was at the task he had taught it.24
Kenneth Cukier, the data editor for The Economist, noted that the
same machine-learning processes that allowed a computer to learn checkers
strategy could allow self-driving cars to learn the rules of the road or for
vehicle warning systems to alert drivers to potentially dangerous conditions
on the road without requiring us to explicitly handle programmatically each
and every situation the program might encounter.25 But rather than just one
car providing data, we might imagine if the data were shared between cars.26
The time it would take for a computer to learn the processes involved in
driving would be far less, just as the process for learning checkers could
have gone faster with multiple computers playing multiple games and
sharing the results.
In the medical field, machine learning was applied to create an
algorithm that would identify cancerous cells within a biopsy.27 Through
19
Kenneth Cukier, Remarks at TEDSalon, Berlin 2014: Why Big Data is Better Data (June 2014)
(transcript available at https://www.ted.com/talks/kenneth_cukier_big_data_is_better_data/ transcript?
language=en).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See Damon Lavrinc, Feds Will Require All New Vehicles to Talk to Each Other, WIRED (Feb. 3,
2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/feds-v2v/.
27
Cukier, supra note 19.
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this process, the computer was able to learn twelve factors that it used to
predict cancer, three of which were previously unknown.28 The sheer
amount of data allowed the algorithm to recognize traits that traditional
medical research had not been able to identify.29 The application of a similar
processes using data from social networking sites linked with medical
records could aid in measuring outcomes and conducting observational
studies.30 The data could also aid in identifying and notifying people at risk
for certain diseases.31
Data can also allow businesses to operate more efficiently.
According to a well-known anecdote among data scientists, through an
analysis of supermarket customers’ purchases, statisticians identified a trend
of diapers and beer being purchased frequently in the same transaction.32 As
a result, stores began to place beer and diapers in closer proximity, or in a
place where customers would have to pass on their way, to the checkout
counter increasing beer sales. While the story itself may just be a thought
experiment, Amazon put the principle in action through its “frequently
purchased together” feature with wild success.33 Target, on the other hand,
was the subject of outrage when they used similar analysis to predict that a
teenage girl was pregnant and sent her coupons for baby items before she
had told her parents.34
These types of pattern recognition processes yield other insights into
individual behavior and characteristics. A recent study in the Proceedings
of the National Academies of Sciences studied users’ Facebook “likes” to
identify which “likes” were the strongest predictors of high intelligence.35
Among the top five was a page dedicated to curly fries.36 While it is very
unlikely the fries themselves have any causative effect on intelligence, the
researchers found that because a smart person had created this page, that
28

Id.
Id.
30
FRANCISCO GRAJALES ET AL., SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND THE CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING
HEALTH SYSTEM: A SURVEY 1–2 (2014), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/PerspectivesFiles/2014/Discussion-Papers/VSRT-PatientDataSharing.pdf.
31
Niven R. Narain, From Big Data to Actionable Data: Has Our Biology Failed Us, or Have We
Failed to Use It?, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/big-dataactionable-data-biology-failed-us-failed-use/; see also Karen Curtin et al., Familial Risk of Childhood
Cancer and Tumors in the Li-Fraumeni Spectrum in the Utah Population Database: Implications for
Genetic Evaluation in Pediatric Practice, 133 INT. J. CANCER 2444, 2452 (2013), available at
http://healthcare.utah.edu/huntsmancancerinstitute/research/labs/schiffman/images/21_Familialriskofchil
dhoodcancer.pdf.
32
See Yen-Liang Chen et al., A Data Mining Approach for Retail Knowledge Discovery with
Consideration of the Effect of Shelf-Space Adjacency on Sales, 42 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 1503,
1504 (2006), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167923606000030#.
33
JP Mangalindan, Amazon’s Recommendation Secret, FORTUNE (July 30, 2012, 11:09 AM),
http://fortune.com/2012/07/30/amazons-recommendation-secret/.
34
Hill, supra note 13.
35
Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records of
Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5804 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/110/15/5802.full.pdf+html.
36
Id.
29
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person was more likely to have smart friends and so it was the way the page
propagated through the social network—not the underlying content—that
made it predictive of higher intelligence.37 These types of processes not
only lend insight into the characteristics of individuals, but can also lend
themselves to development of a kind of topology of how ideas and
behaviors move through social networks.38
Using data from social media, researchers were able to create
mechanisms to predict political preference, gender, sexual orientation,
religion, and age.39 At times, the content of the data itself directly reveals
the attribute without the need for statistical analysis, for example, affiliation
with gay groups like “Being Gay” or “Gay Marriage.”40 The researchers
note that the process they use raises “negative implications, because it can
easily be applied to large numbers of people without obtaining their
individual consent and without them noticing . . . [and] [o]ne can imagine
situations in which such predictions, even if incorrect, could pose a threat to
an individual’s well-being, freedom, or even life.”41
The crux of the danger that big data presents is that consumers are
largely unaware of the consequences of the seemingly mundane things that
they share everyday through their online activities.42 Theoretically, analysis
of the same, publically available data that researchers have used to predict
an individual’s age, race and gender could also be used to predict drug and
alcohol use, propensity for criminal activity, any number of hiring criteria,
or even credit risk.43 This also presents the risk of discrimination for
protected classes because membership in that class could be predicted using
data from social media and hidden within an algorithm, allowing
organizations to hide discriminatory practices.44
2. Benefits and Risks of Individualized Data
Predictive generalizations are not the only application of large
datasets. Data can have an impact on an individual basis. In her TED talk,
37
Jennifer Golbeck, Remarks at TEDx, MidAtlantic 2013: The Curly Fry Conundrum: Why Social
Media “Likes” Say More Than You Might Think (Oct. 2013) (transcript available at
https://www.ted.com/talks/jennifer_golbeck_the_curly_fry_conundrum_why_social_media_likes_say_m
ore_than_you_might_think/transcript?language=en (suggesting that homophily, the tendency for people
to befriend those that are like themselves, might explain the relationship between high intelligence and
curly fries).
38
Eric Gilbert & Garrie Karahalios, Predicting Tie Strength with Social Media, CHI Proceedings of
the 27th International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 212 (2009), available at
http://leonidzhukov.net/hse/2011/seminar/papers/chi09-tie-gilbert.pdf; Golbeck, supra note 37.
39
Kosinski, supra note 35, at 5804.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 5805.
42
Id. at 5802; Golbeck, supra note 37.
43
Cukier, supra note 19.
44
See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Remarks on Behalf of the Federal Trade Commission: Big Data:
A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? (Sept. 15, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/audio-video/video/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-part-1).
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Talithia Williams shares the story of how tracking her individual data
allowed her to make better decisions regarding her pregnancy.45 Based on
decades of data, doctors estimate due dates for pregnant women assuming a
twenty-eight day menstruation cycle.46 Because she kept track of her cycle,
Ms. Williams knew that she did not fit this generalization, and was able to
determine that the decision to induce labor was premature.47 But,
individualized data like this may already be available without requiring us to
gather it ourselves.48
Both individualized and aggregate data allows marketers to target
their advertisements, reducing the cost to the company as well as the
annoyance to the potential consumer.49 Marketers seek to identify a need
and show the consumer how to fill it.50 They don’t want to market to
uninterested consumers because it is expensive both in terms the cost of the
advertisement as well as in terms of the potential business relationship.51
Data allows marketing to work more efficiently for all parties.52 Knowledge
of a potential customer’s individual likes and dislikes eliminates the
guesswork associated with aggregate data.53 A McKinsey report estimates
the potential annual consumer surplus from using personal location data at
$600 billion and the potential increase in retailers’ operating margins at
60%.54
However, individualized data presents risks similar to those for
aggregate data. Instead of the risk of being wrongly categorized, individual
data has the potential to invade user privacy when it is collected without the
user’s knowledge, again, perhaps placing in jeopardy “an individual’s wellbeing, freedom, or even life.”55 Moreover, the kinds of data now routinely
collected could be used to perpetrate identity theft. One researcher found
that using data available for purchase online allowed him to link a user’s
name to a full nine-digit social security number in 86% of his trials.56 The
2012 Global Internet User Survey found that the unexpected use of personal
45
Talithia Williams, Remarks at TEDxClaremontColleges: Own Your Body’s Data (Feb. 2014)
(transcript available at https://www.ted.com/talks/talithia_williams_own_your_body_s_data/transcript?
language=en).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See Kosinski, supra note 35, at 5802.
49
See Saul Hansell, A Guide to Google’s New Privacy Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009, 6:08
AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/a-guide-to-googles-new-privacy-controls/?_r=1.
50
Personal Interview with Mike Brian, Partner, Penna Powers (Sept. 16, 2014).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See Kosinski, supra note 35, at 5804–05.
54
JAMES ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION,
COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_
technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation; see also Rathburn & Dunlap, supra note 7.
55
Kosinski, supra note 35, at 5805.
56
David Goldman, Rapleaf is Selling Your Identity, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2010, 1:13 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/21/technology/rapleaf/ (noting further that the researcher asked not to be
identified because of business dealings with several companies in the field).
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information disclosed online resulted in loss of money in 8% of cases, theft
of personal information in 17% of cases, impersonation in 9% of cases, and
credit damage in 4% of cases.57
B. Methods of Collection and Use
In addition to mining public records and the data that users
knowingly share online, companies use technologies embedded in their
websites to generate data on users. Aggregators purchase this data and use
it for targeted marketing or serving personalized content in apps.
1. Methods of Online Data Collection
The familiar means of tracking user behavior online is through the
use of cookies.58 Upon logging into a service, a file containing a unique
string of characters is installed on the user’s computer.59 This allows the site
to recognize the user as they navigate the website without the need for
reauthentication.60 What consumers might not know is that this file also
gives the site the ability to log the way they interact with the site.61
Consumers will soon produce even more data as items like appliances and
cars are added to the “Internet of Things.”
Normally cookies only track interactions at a single website.62
“Supercookies,” as they have come to be called, have the ability to track a
user across multiple websites and recreate cookies after a user deletes
them.63 After the practice was publicized in the media, user outcry caused
most companies to disclaim use of supercookies.64 Nevertheless, a new
variety of supercookie has resurfaced among cell phone service providers
using a similar method.65
Canvas fingerprinting is a new technology with the potential to
replace supercookies.66 The “canvas” tag in a new version of the computer
57
Global Internet User Survey 2012, INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.internetsociety.org/apps/
surveyexplorer/online-privacy-and-identity/what-were-the-consequences-of-the-unexpected-use-ofpersonal-information-disclosed-online-14/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
58
See A.E.S., How Online Advertisers Read Your Mind, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2014, 11:50
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains-12.
59
Id.
60
Cookies: Frequently Asked Questions, ABOUTCOOKIES.ORG, http://www.aboutcookies.org/
default.aspx?page=5 (last visited January 26, 2015) [hereinafter Cookies FAQ].
61
A.E.S., supra note 58.
62
See Cookies FAQ, supra note 60 (describing session, or transient cookies and permanent cookies).
63
Id. (describing flash cookies); see also Nicholas Jackson, The Next Online Privacy Battle:
Powerful Supercookies, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 18, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2011/08/the-next-online-privacy-battle-powerful-supercookies/243800/.
64
Jackson, supra note 63.
65
Robert McMillan, Verizon’s “Perma-Cookie” is a Privacy-Killing Machine, WIRED (Oct. 27,
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/verizons-perma-cookie/.
66
GUNES ACAR ET AL., THE WEB NEVER FORGETS: PERSISTENT TRACKING MECHANISMS IN THE
WILD 676 (2014), available at https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/the_web_
never_forgets.pdf.
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language used to program web sites includes a feature that allows forms to
be drawn on the fly using a script that translates unique characteristics of the
user’s computer into an image similar to a fingerprint.67 Through a process
of recognizing variations in the way the form is drawn and hiding it from the
user, websites can recognize the user even after the user has deleted any
cookies installed in their browser—all without notifying the user.68 Even
after using opt-out pages, researchers determined that the fingerprinting
method continued collecting data.69
The Internet of Things is the result of adding Internet connectivity
to more and more devices.70 It will allow users “to digitally identify,
observe and control objects in the physical world” via the Internet.71
Everything from sprinkler systems72 to kitchen appliances73 is being
converted into an Internet device. Data produced by these devices will be
invaluable to companies seeking to gain insight into the way users interact
with their products.74
2. Data Aggregation
Beyond using data for different kinds of analysis or marketing, a
growing area of user concern is the sale of data to companies that combine
data from several sources.75 But not all of these “aggregators” appear to
pose the same level of concern. To illustrate the variety of ways aggregators
function, consider two examples: Rapleaf and Factual.
Rapleaf was one of several companies in the business of
constructing consumer profiles using data gathered from social media.76
They gathered email and physical addresses, income, and likes and dislikes,
including music habits from Pandora and wish lists from Amazon.77 The
company had detailed profiles for over 400 million web users.78 This data
could be linked back to the individual user’s Facebook account, providing
several means of contacting the user.79 The company offered a way for
consumers to log in and view these profiles, but this offers little relief
67

Id. at 674.
Id. at 674–75.
69
Id. at 685.
70
JAN HÖLLER ET AL., FROM MACHINE-TO-MACHINE TO THE INTERNET OF THINGS: INTRODUCTION
TO A NEW AGE OF INTELLIGENCE 3–4 (2014).
71
Id. at 11.
72
E.g. SKYDROP, http://www.skydrop.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
73
Michael Wolf, How the Internet of Things is Reinventing the Kitchen, FORBES (July 31, 2014,
3:35
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelwolf/2014/07/31/how-the-internet-of-things-is-rein
venting -the-kitchen/.
74
JAN HÖLLER ET AL., supra note 70, at 65, 66.
75
See FTC REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
76
Id. at 8–9.
77
Goldman, supra note 56.
78
Id.
79
Id.
68
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because few consumers even know they exist and the level of detail they
provide.80 As David Goldman from CNN Money noted, “[i]t’s one thing for
a marketer to know you're 40 years old and subscribe to travel magazines;
it's another for them to know you're leaving Saturday for a week in Italy.”81
Moreover, because the data can be linked with other data sets, the
information can be traced back to a particular individual, allowing the
aggregator to create detailed profiles of individual users.82 Malicious use of
this data can result in serious consequences including loss of money, theft of
personal information, impersonation, and credit damage.83
Factual created a hub of data to allow the user experience for
smartphone apps to be personalized for each user based on the user’s
location.84 Businesses provide Factual with data about the location of the
business and services.85 As a consumer uses an app at a place that Factual
recognizes as a golf course, Factual might infer that the consumer is a
golfer.86 Gil Elbaz, Factual’s founder, assures us that “[a]ll of this can be
done without knowing anything about who they are, their email address, or
anything that’s privately identifiable . . . [w]e’re simply in the background
helping these companies make sense of the information they already
have.”87 By aggregating information on businesses, Factual allows apps to
provide personalized content without the need to gather information on
users.
C. Current Legal Framework
The major regulator in the data industry is the FTC, but other
regulators like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) also
exercise a role in enforcing the patchwork of laws intended to protect data
under different circumstances.
Federal laws regulate privacy using a “sectoral rather than omnibus
approach.”88 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) regulates financial
data, requiring financial institutions to provide notice of their privacy
policies and the opportunity to opt out of having information shared.89 The
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) places limits on users and producers of
80
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consumer credit reports including imposing duties with regard to accuracy
The Health Insurance Portability and
and dispute resolution.90
Accountability Act (“HIPPA”) regulates medical data, setting standards for
its use and protection.91 The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act (“CAN-SPAM”) regulates collection and
use of email addresses.92 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”) regulates data from the content of electronic communications.93
The FTC is calling for greater transparency and accountability for
data brokers, but has largely declined to provide hard and fast rules, leaving
privacy to be regulated according the policies of each individual company.94
While HIPPA and FCRA offer protections for health and financial data,
there are no minimum standards for generic types of data other than those
companies that choose to self-impose through their privacy policies.95
Some states have enacted data privacy laws to fill this void.
California requires companies to disclose to consumers when they share
personal information with third parties,96 put reasonable security measures
in place,97 and provide users under eighteen-years old with a right similar to
the European Union’s (“EU”) “right to be forgotten.”98
D. Looking to the Banking Industry
In a Forrester survey, consumers ranked banks as the type of
company they consider most trustworthy when it comes to their data with
45% of respondents indicating that they trusted banks.99 With banking’s
reputation for honesty only beginning to recover after plummeting during
the financial crisis in 2009 and 2010,100 we might well ask how banks are
90
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gaining trust.
First, banks are required to make initial disclosures before allowing
electronic transfers to occur101 and must provide an annual notice describing
changes in terms and methods of resolving errors.102 The content is
standardized and even the formatting must adhere to a set of clear guidelines
provided by regulators.103 Second, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) requires financial institutions to
refrain from any unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.104 These
UDAAP standards have allowed regulators to hold financial institutions
accountable.105 Unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices are each
associated with a separate legal standard.106 The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) noted that their understanding of the “unfair”
and “deceptive” was informed by the FTC’s understanding of those terms in
the FTC Act.107 Ironically, the FTC could now look to the CFPB to expand
their enforcement regime beyond companies’ self-imposed privacy policies.
Indeed, data collectors and users could benefit substantially from a set of
similar standardized disclosures and enforceable guidelines for the industry.
III. ANALYSIS
The ubiquity of data and its use across industries and geographic
boundaries call for a standardized approach to protecting privacy. The
system currently in place leaves consumers as well as companies relying on
unenforceable industry best practices and guidelines. The FTC enforces the
privacy policies that companies choose to provide, but each business has a
different privacy policy so consumers are forced to either understand the
complicated provisions on each website or risk forfeiting their privacy. A
standardized set of minimum requirements would bring certainty to the
market for both businesses and consumers.108
In order to ensure that the exchange of access to online services in
101
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return for consumer data is meaningful and fair, the consumer must, at the
very least, be kept informed of the actual price they are paying in exchange
for the services they use online. But, regulations need not go so far as those
that govern health and financial data. Less sensitive data warrants less
regulatory scrutiny. However, there should be a floor to the privacy
afforded to users and rules to bring uniformity to disclosures. Regulations
currently in place for financial institutions could serve as a model to produce
a risk-based, disclosure-oriented regulatory scheme for the data industry.
A. Adapting the Standards Based on User-Site Relationship, Information
Sensitivity, and Use
As a preliminary matter, the rules governing data should adapt
based on the wide variety of relationships between sites and users, data
types, and data uses. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s benchmark for fair information collection begins by
recommending disclosure of the purpose of the data collection and obtaining
consent before data is collected.109 In the 2012 version, it noted that prior
affirmative consent in all cases would be impractical.110 This makes
especially good sense in cases where the relative risk to consumers is
diminished. The FTC could consider the following as factors that play into
determining the level of risk to the consumer: (1) whether the user sets up an
account, (2) the type of data collected, and (3) whether data is sold to or
shared with third parties.
When a consumer sets up an account, it suggests the expectation of
a permanent relationship. A user should, therefore, expect the website to
gather more information as a part of the terms of use after appropriate
disclosures are provided.111 But, when the consumer chooses not to set up
an account, the assumption is that the relationship is only temporary. The
account signup process gives users the opportunity to consider whether, and
to what extent, to allow the site to track their activities—provided they are
presented with appropriate disclosures as a part of that process. Under these
conditions, the risk that consumers are being tracked unwittingly is greatly
diminished and the consumer can then be expected to manage what they
choose to reveal. Requiring an account signup when the site conducts
persistent tracking methods thus diminishes the level of risk to the
109
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 14 (2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf.
110
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http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpe
rsonaldata.htm (“The knowledge or consent of the data subject is as a rule essential, knowledge being the
minimum requirement. On the other hand . . . there are situations where for practical or policy reasons
the data subject's knowledge or consent cannot be considered necessary.”).
111
See infra Part III.B.1.
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consumer.
Likewise, collection of certain kinds of data pose more risk to
consumer privacy than others. Knowing that a particular consumer is a
golfer or reads articles about constitutional law presents a low level of risk.
Data that includes methods to contact the individual or information that
allows the data to be linked with other datasets presents a greater risk to
consumers.112 Analysis of non-identifying data yields generalizations about
different types of consumers, while analysis of personally-identifying-data
(“PID” or “PII”) allows greater access into the personal details of an
individual’s life.
Users decide which sites they will visit and what information they
will share. Selling data to other sites presents a greater risk of invading
privacy because the user no longer has control over which sites have their
data. The fact that a site sells or shares data presents a greater risk to
consumer privacy because the consumer loses control of the data after it is
sold.
The regulatory requirements should consider these factors when
determining which requirements to impose and the extent of the
requirements. For example, the fact that a site sells or shares data would
tend toward requiring prior, affirmative disclosure, but if the site were only
sharing non-identifying information, the diminished risk might make a link
to the policy online sufficient.
B. Potential Regulatory Requirements
Regulations should provide uniform rules on disclosures that alert
consumers to the scope of the data collection and use, when consumers must
be given the opportunity to opt-out of collection and stop the use, and limits
on the kinds of data that can be collected based on the services provided.
1. Disclosures
Any regulatory system for data gathering should focus on
disclosure. Surveys show that consumers are not upset by the fact that they
are being tracked, indeed many enjoy the benefits.113 It is the fact that data is
being gathered without their knowledge that poses the problem.114
Upon signing up to use a website, users, perhaps unwittingly,
consent to an exchange of the site’s services for their personal
information.115 In order to make an informed decision, consumers must be
112
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alerted to the terms of this exchange. Advocates for the self-regulatory
scheme currently in place argue that privacy policies are sufficient to alert
users to this payment.116 Since there are no minimum requirements for these
policies, users must bear the transactional costs in time and effort to
understand the policies of each site they use or risk forfeiting their privacy.
Before allowing consumers to set up electronic transfers or apply
for card accounts, financial institutions must provide consumers with
disclosures substantially in the same form as the model forms provided in
the rule.117 Recently, the CFPB began testing a new form for prepaid card
disclosures after finding that the varying disclosures produced by each
company made it difficult for the consumer to make comparisons.118
Likewise, a standardized disclosure provided as a part of the signup process
for a website could disclose its privacy practices regarding types of
information it tracks and the way the information can be used. For example,
consider Capital One’s privacy statement,119 which includes a list of the
personal information collected and a box that lists how it uses personal
information and discloses the opportunity to opt out. This includes whether
they sell data to third parties.
As argued above, the regulatory scheme should be adjusted based
on the level of privacy risk. Due to the sensitive nature of financial data, the
GLBA requires disclosures on a yearly basis.120 For more mundane types of
data, disclosure upon signup with access to revoke consent through a
settings page is probably sufficient. If a site does not gather personally
identifying information, even less would be required—a notification on the
page with a link to the site’s privacy policy is probably sufficient.121
2. Opt-Out and Revocation of Consent
In banking regulations, one concern that has arisen with requiring
banks to obtain consent from customers before providing overdraft services
is whether banks will attempt to coerce consumers into opting into the
service.122 Regulations require banks to offer the same terms, conditions,
and features to consumers that opt out.123 This is perhaps because regulators
116
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take the position that overdraft programs are inherently harmful to
consumers.124
Capital One’s privacy statement explains that the consumer cannot
opt out of every type of data use.125 Likewise, websites provide services
based on the assumption that they will be able to benefit from the user’s
data.126 If a user were given power to retroactively withdraw consent, some
sites would not be able to provide the service without charging a fee.127 A
site should be able to decide whether to offer its services on a fee basis or
simply deny services. Companies should not, however, have the ability to
attract users using a favorable privacy policy and then coerce them to opting
in to data sharing to continue receiving the service. Likewise, users should
not be able to use a “right to be forgotten” to change the terms of service
after the fact.128
3. Usage Based Data Collection
Some websites gather much more information about users than is
necessary to allow the site to function.129 For example, the FTC issued a
consent order to the makers of a flashlight app that gathered and transmitted
“their devices’ precise geolocation along with persistent device identifiers to
various third parties.”130 The FTC focused on the fact that end user license
agreement (“EULA”) misrepresented that consumers had the right to opt out
of this data collection, labeling this an unfair and deceptive practice.131 The
problem with this practice goes much deeper than any misrepresentation in
the EULA.
The HIPPA requires entities to limit the use and disclosure of
protected health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish the
intended purpose.132 Likewise, when a consumer agrees to allow a company
to collect their data in exchange for the use of that company’s services, there
is an expectation that the data gathered will be related to—or at the very
least commensurate with—that company’s services. For example, a user
would expect a mapping program to track location data, but the user would
not expect a flashlight app to track their location. In order to keep the
exchange between users and websites fair, data collection must be
124
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commensurate with the services rendered to the user.
C. Enforcement
1. UDAAP as the Measuring Stick
UDAAP standards developed in the banking industry could aid the
FTC in enforcing the standards it promulgates. Until now, FTC actions
have focused on enforcing businesses’ self-imposed privacy policies,
arguing unfairness and deception when the businesses fail to do so.133
UDAAP could offer a more robust set of guidelines for data collection
practices.
Under UDAAP, a practice is unfair when (1) it causes injury, (2) the
injury is not reasonably avoidable, and (3) the injury is not outweighed by a
countervailing benefit to the consumer or to competition.134 A practice is
deceptive when it (1) misleads or is likely to mislead a consumer, (2) the
consumer’s misinterpretation would be reasonable under the circumstances,
and (3) the deception is material to the “consumer’s choice of, or conduct
regarding, the product or service.”135 Abusive practices interfere with the
consumer’s ability to understand a term or condition of the service or takes
unreasonable advantage of a consumer’s (1) lack of understanding regarding
risks, costs, or conditions; (2) inability to protect that consumer’s best
interests; or (3) reasonable reliance on the business to act in the consumer’s
best interests.136 With few, minor changes, these standards could serve as
the standards for the data collection and analysis industries.
The injury requirement in the unfairness standard usually focuses on
the loss of money. Here, the currency involved in the exchange is the user’s
data.137 Unfairness in data collection and use should therefore focus on the
opportunity for the consumer to avoid being tracked and whether the data
gathered is in proportion with the services provided. For example, failing to
disclose the data that will be tracked as a result of using the site, or setting
up an account, is unfair because the consumer is unwittingly giving away
their data. Likewise, a service’s data gathering is also unfair when it is not
associated with, or proportional to, the benefit that the user receives. For
example, a flashlight app’s gathering of location data is unfair because it
fails to provide a commensurate benefit in exchange for that data.138
Deception occurs when a user is misled in a material way with
regard to the exchange taking place. The FTC already enforces this part of
133
134
135
136
137
138
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UDAAP as it evaluates EULAs and takes action when companies fail to
adhere to them.139 But, this standard could also extend to the form of the
disclosures that would be required. Consumers should be able to assume
that sensitive data cannot be collected without prior, and effective,
disclosure. Depending on the relative sensitivity of the data, if a disclosure
fails to alert consumers that they are being tracked, the disclosure might be
considered not only unfair, but potentially deceptive because the user is
being materially misled as to the price that they are actually paying in
exchange for the services.
The abuse standard under UDAAP has been the most troublesome
for the financial industry,140 but it need not pose the same problems in the
data industry. Abuse occurs when the business takes unreasonable
advantage of the user’s relative position with regard to understanding the
costs and risks associated with the exchange. One of the common
definitions of abuse is “improper or excessive use . . . .”141 In the data
collection industry, abuse could therefore focus on improper uses of the data
rather than abuse of the user providing it. A data company’s failure to
adequately secure data or use of the data to harm a consumer’s credit
(without first disclosing that the data gathered may be used in this way at the
time of collection) could each be considered abusive.
2. Data Broker Registry
To aid enforcement, the FTC could also consider creating a registry
for companies that purchase and aggregate data. Because of the risk of
identity theft and the distance between consumer and data holder, a
regulator is needed to ensure consumers are protected.
Federal law allows states to impose registration requirements on
businesses that receive funds from consumers for the purposes of
transferring the funds by wire, check, draft, facsimile, courier, etc.142 The
purpose of the registration is to aid investigation of money laundering and
ensure that consumers are protected from financial loss. Similarly, the
aggregation of personally identifying information lends itself to the risk of
identity theft. Safety and soundness requirements should be imposed to
mitigate the risk of identity theft because the consumer has no direct
relationship with these businesses and therefore, has no control over their
actions.
139
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IV. CONCLUSION
Even after the financial crisis, financial institutions are still the most
trusted entities with regard to personal data. Regulations that have proven
effective in the financial industry can be adapted into a risk-based,
disclosure-oriented regulatory framework that will protect consumers while
avoiding undue burden on Internet companies. The requirements under this
framework should adapt based on the level of risk that a practice presents to
consumers and should include disclosure and opt-out requirements as well
as restrictions on data collection based on the service the data collector
provides in exchange. UDAAP can serve as an effective measure for the
FTC to apply as it enforces these requirements.

Published by eCommons, 2015

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss2/3

